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JTOISPICHQH 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(j). 
DETSRMIIfATIVB ATO8QRIIEI2S 
The following authorities may be dispositive of certain issues 
of this Appeal: 
Rule 8, U.R.C.P. General rules of pleading• 
(c) Affirmative defenses• In pleading to a 
proceeding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively 
... fraud ... and any other matter constituted an avoidance 
of affirmative defense. 
Rule 9, U.R.C.P. Pleading special Batters. 
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all 
averments of fraud ... the circumstances constituting 
fraud ... shall be stated with particularity. 
• e • 
- Vlil -
Rule 11, U.R.C.P. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other 
papers; sanctions. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, 
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modication, or 
reversal of existing law... If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court ... 
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include 
... a reasonable attorney's fee." 
Rule 12, U.R.C.P. Defenses and objections. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses 
and objections which he does not present either by motion 
as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in 
his answer or reply ••. 
Rule 69, U.R.C.P. Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto. 
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to 
enforce a judgment shall be by a writ of execution unless 
the court otherwise directs ... 
(b) Contents of writ and to who it may be directed. 
. . . it [the writ of execution] shall be directed to the 
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in 
cases involving real property and shall require the officer 
to proceed in accordance with the terms of the writ; 
provided that if such writ is against the property of the 
judgment debtor generally it may direct the constable to 
satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the personal 
property of the [judgment] debtor and if sufficient 
personal property cannot be found then the Sheriff shall 
satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of his real 
property. 
(d) Service of the writ. Unless the execution 
otherwise directs the officer must execute the writ against 
the property of the judgment debtor by levying on a 
sufficient amount of property, if their is sufficient 
[property]; ..• 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real 
property the officer shall give to the purchaser 
a certificate of sale, containing: ... (4) a 
statement to the effect that all right, title, 
interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and 
to the property is conveyed to the purchaser; 
U.C.A. 25-1-13. Bona fide purchasers not affected. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed 
to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable 
consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had 
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate 
grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such 
grantor. 
U.C.A. 25-1-15. Rights of creditors with matured claims. 
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to 
a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has nurtured, may, 
as against any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of 
the purchase or one who has derived title immediately or 
mediately from such a purchaser: 
U.C.A. 57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed. 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass 
by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the 
conveyance that a lesser estate was intended. 
U.C.A. 57-4a-4. Presumptions. 
(1) A recorded document creates the following 
presumptions regarding title to the rral property affected: 
(a) the Document is genuine and was 
executed voluntarily by the person purporting to 
execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and 
the person on whose behalf it is executed are 
the persons they purport to be; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any 
lapse of time between dates on the document and 
the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or 
beneficiary of an interest created or described 
by the document acted in good faith at all 
relevant times; ... 
U.C.A. 78-12-26. Within three years — Within three years. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the 
aggravated party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake• 
— v — 
U.C.A. 78-22-1. Lien of judgment. 
From the time the judgment of the district court or 
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the 
cleark of the district court of the county it becomes a 
lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not 
exempt from execution, in the county in which the judgment 
is entered, owned by him at the time or by him thereafter 
acquired during the existence of said lien. ... 
U.C.A. 78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or 
defense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by 
statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith* 
SI&TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves quashal of an execution sale and quiet 
title to Plaintiff's real property. A judgment creditor of a prior 
joint tenancy owner, claiming a judgment lien, levied execution on 
and sold the property of Plaintiff, who was not a judgment or execu-
tion debtor. Under summary judgment, the trial court found that no 
lien attached, voided the sale, and awarded damages to Plaintiff. 
Willard and Tonya Wood ("Woods") purchased certain real property 
("Property") from Ralph and Elaine Kofoed in May 1979, pursuant to an 
installment real estate contract. The contract was subject to a 
first mortgage. For some unknown reason, in December 1979, Kofoeds 
delivered a warranty deed to Woods which was then recorded. In May 
1980, Willard Wood conveyed his joint tenacy interest by a recorded 
warranty deed ("Willard Wood Deed") to his wife, Tonya Wood. In June 
1981, a money judgment ("Judgment") was entered against Willard Wood 
in favor of appellants Max Burton [Sr*] and Emily Burton ("Burtons"). 
When it was docketed, Willard Wood had no interest in the Property, 
having previously conveyed his interest to Tonya Wood. 
In September 1981, Gregory Baldwin and appellee Lynda Baldwin, 
("Baldwins") purchased a home from Tonya Wood for $215#000, pursuant 
to a recorded warranty deed. Immediately prior to Baldwins' 
purchase, Tonya Wood executed and recorded a trust deed ("Kofoed 
Trust Deed") in favor of Kofoeds, and Baldwins took fee simple title 
subject to it and the first mortgage. Willard Wood also signed the 
Kofoed Trust Deed, which gave the appearance on the public record 
that he had some naked interest in the Property, notwithstanding he 
had conveyed his estate to Tonya Wood in May 1980. Therefore, upon 
Baldwins' purchase from Tonya Wood, Willard Wood also signed the deed 
- r -
to Baldwins to eliminate such naked interest• At the time, Baldwins 
had no notice of the Willard Wood Deed or the Judgment. 
In December 1982, Gregory Baldwin conveyed his interest in the 
Property by recorded quite claim deed to Lynda Baldwin. In April 
1983, Willard Wood filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition ("Wood's 
Bankruptcy,f) and listed and notified Burtons as his creditors. The 
Wood's Bankruptcy voided the Judgment to the extent of any personal 
obligation of Willard Wood thereunder. 
In June 1987, the assignee beneficiary under the Kofoed Trust 
Deed foreclosed the interest of Lynda Baldwin pursuant to a trustee's 
sale. In October 1987, Lynda Baldwin reacquired the property from 
the purchaser at the trustee's sale. Prior to the trustee's sale, 
Burtons received notice of it and caused a writ of execution to issue 
under the Judgment• The writ was initiated by Burtons notwithstand-
ing the Judgment had been voided and a bankruptcy stay order was in 
affect. The writ represented that the Judgment was enforceable and 
commanded the sheriff to levy on and sell the "unexeiipt real property 
of the said Willard D. Wood," the judgment debtor. The writ was 
issued, notwithstanding there was no valid lien on the Property. 
Simultaneously, Burtons issued a praecipe to the sheriff 
directing him to levy on "the rightf title and interest of Gregory 
Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors-in-interest of Willard D. 
Wood" in the Property. Pursuant to Burtons' instructions, the 
sheriff levied execution not on Willard Wood's alleged interest, the 
judgment debtor, but directly on Baldwins' interest. The sheriff 
advertised Baldwins' interest for sale, sold it at a sheriff's sale, 
and filed a notice of sale of such interest* The sheriff then 
recorded a certificate of sale of Baldwins' interest, and delivered 
a sheriff's deed for such interest to Emily Burton and her son, Max 
Burton Jr. ("Burton, Jr."). Burtons caused the levy against Lynda 
Baldwin's property notwithstanding she was not a party to Burtons' 
prior lawsuit against Willard Wood, not a judgment debtor under the 
Judgment, and not an execution debtor under the writ of execution. 
Burtons and Burton Jr. ("Burton Group") assert that the Willard 
Wood Deed was a fraudulent conveyance, notwithstanding they have 
never made a claim to void it; that Willard Wood had an estate in the 
Property, notwithstanding the conveyance, and a judgment lien 
attached to that interest; tha tBurtons could "disregarding the 
conveyance" and levy execution directly on the interest of Baldwins 
as alleged "successors-in-interest of Willard Wood"; and that the 
Burton Group was not required to take any equitable action or assert 
any claim to void the conveyance. The Burton Group also asserts that 
if Lynda Baldwin was a bona-fide purchaser for value from Tonya Wood, 
she lost that status because of the subsequent trustee's sale of her 
interest. Thus, the Burton Group asserts that Emily Burton and 
Burton Jr. now own all the interest of Lynda Baldwin in the Property. 
Paul Richins, substitute appellee for Lynda Baldwin, asserts 
that the Willard Wood Deed was a prima facie valid conveyance that 
could only be voided, if at all, by an equitable action by Burtons if 
they thought it was fraudulent; that the Burton Group has not 
commenced an equitable action or made a claim for fraud to void the 
deed; that even if the deed was fraudulent, Baldwins purchased the 
property from Tonya Wood, not Willard Wood, without notice of any 
alleged fraud under the Willard Wood Deed, and thus Baldwins were 
bona-fide purchasers for value; that Lynda Baldwin did not loose that 
status because of the subsequent trustee's sale; and that following 
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the subsequent trustee's sale, Lynda Baldwin reacquired the Property 
and has fee simple title* 
After reacquiring the property, Lynda Baldwin amended her 
complaint and moved for summary judgment to void the Judgment, quash 
the execution sale, void the sheriff's deed, quiet her title, recover 
her damages for Burtons' wrongful execution, and dismiss the Burton 
Groups' counterclaim. The Burton Group also moved for summary 
judgment on their counterclaim. 
In its Memorandum Decision, and subsequent 1989 Order and 
Partial Summary Judgment, both dated June 21, 1989, the trial court 
held that the Willard Wood Deed was valid; that Willard Wood had no 
interest in the Property when the Judgment was entered; that the 
Judgment was voided by Wood's Bankruptcy; that Burtons' execution 
upon Lynda Baldwin's property was wrongful and void; and that Lynda 
Baldwin's damages resulting from the wrongful execution would be 
reserved for later determination. Lynda Baldwin's title was quieted 
and the Burton Groups' counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. In 
its later 1990 Order and 1990 Judgment, both dated June 4, 1990, the 
trial court awarded damages to Lynda Baldwin of $7,872.66, 
representing her "attorney's fees and related damagesH in the matter. 
After the Burton Group filed the appeal, Paul Richins became the 
assignee of appellee Lynda Baldwin's judgment and interest, and was 
later substituted as appellee in her place with the consent of 
appellants. Paul Richins asserts the trial court was justified in 
all respects because of the Burton Group's clearly wrongful execution 
on a void judgment, without a valid statutory lien or due process, 
and against the property of a person who was neither a judgment 
debtor or execution debtor nor party to that proceeding. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The following parties are hereinafter referred to as follows: 
Appellee Lynda C. Baldwin as "Lynda Baldwin"; Gregory B. Baldwin as 
"Greg Baldwin"; Lynda Baldwin and Greg Baldwin collectively as 
"Baldwins"; Willard D. Wood as "Willard Wood"; Tonya G. Wood as 
"Tonya Wood"; Willard Wood and Tonya Wood collectively as "Woods"; 
Appellant Max D. Burton, Sr. as "Burton, Sr."; Appellant Emily A. 
Burton as "Emily Burton"; Appellants Burton, Sr, and Emily Burton 
collectively as "Burtons"; Appellant Max D. Burton, Jr. as "Burton, 
Jr."; the Burtons and Burton, Jr. collectively as "Burton Group"; 
M.D. "Pete" Hayward as "Sheriff"; and Substitute Appellee Paul H. 
Richins as "Richins". 
The following material facts are alleged in Lynda Baldwin's 
"Amended Complaint" ("Complaint"), (R. 288), and in her "Memorandum 
In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment" ("Memorandum"), (R. 425), 
and "Supplemental Motion For Summary Judgment" ("Supplemental 
Motion"), (Re 472). Except for facts #10 in the Memorandum, these 
facts are substantially uncontroverted in the Burton Group's "Answer 
To Amended Complaint" ("Answer"), (Re 387), and in their responses to 
those Motions, (R. 488; R. 498), Ss& Rule 4-501(5), C.J.A.: 
1. On May 15, 1979, Kofoed, as sellers, and Woods, as buyers, 
executed a "Uniform Real Estate Contract" ("Kofoed Contract") for the 
Property. (R. 325) On December 19, 1979, Kofoeds, as grantors, 
executed a "Warranty Deed" ("Kofoed Deed") for the Property to Woods, 
as grantees, which was recorded on December 19, 1979. (R. 328; R. 
289, #10; R. 389, #1) Under the Kofoed Deed, Woods acquired the 
Property as joint tenants. (R. 290, #11; R. 389, #1) 
2. On May 1, 1980, Willard Wood, as grantor, executed a 
"Warranty Deed" ("Willard Wood Deed") for his joint tenancy interest 
in the Property to Tonya Wood, as grantee, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "A", which was recorded on May 28, 1980. (R.329; 
R. 290, #12; R. 389, #1; R. 70, #3) 
3. On February 20, 1981, Burtons, as plaintiffs, filed a 
"Verified Complaint" in another action against Clealon Mann and 
Willard Wood, as defendants ("Burton Lawsuit"). (R. 330; R. 290, 
#13; R. 389, #1) 
4. On June 9, 1981, an in personam " ?* miUfl fY Judgment" 
("Judgment") was entered in the Burton Lawsuit in favor of Burtons 
against Clealon Mann and Willard Wood, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "B". (R. 333; R. 290, #13; R. 389, #1) The Judgment did not 
create a statutory lien on the Property under Section 78-22-1, 
U.C.A., because Willard Wood had no interest in it when the Judgment 
was docketed. 
5. On September 30, 1981, Woods, as trustors, executed a "Trust 
Deec^ " ("Kofoed Trust Deed") covering the Property in favor of 
Kofoeds, as beneficiaries, which was recorded on October 2, 1981. 
(R. 334; R. 290, #15; R. 389, #1) 
6e On September 30, 1981, Baldwins purchased the Property from 
Tonya Wood for $215,000.00, all of which has been paid. (R. 89, #2; 
R. 85, #2; R. 290, #16; R. 389, #1; R. 409, #3) Tonya Wood was the 
only titled owner of record. (R. 158; R. 546; #6; R. 550) On the 
same day, Tonya Wood, as grantor, executed a "Warranty Deed" ("Woods' 
Deed") for the Property to Baldwins, as grantees, which was recorded 
on October 2, 1981. (R. 337; R. 291, #19; R. 389, #1) 
Notwithstanding Willard Wood also signed this deed, he had no 
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interest to convey because he had previously conveyed it to Tonya 
Wood under the Willard Wood Deed. (Ex. nAw) 
7. Upon acquiring the Property, Baldwins did not have any 
notice from any source of the Judgment itself, (R. R. 81; #3; R. 86, 
#3; R. 410, #4; R. 413, #4; R. 546, #8; R. 566, #3); no notice 
whatsoever of any alleged fraud under the Willard Wood Deed, (R. 546, 
#8); and no notice of anything that would cause them to know or 
believe that there was anything improper regarding the Willard Wood 
Deed or that would cause them to inquire further into that 
conveyance, (R. 410, #5; R. 413, #5; R. 566, #3). Baldwins believed 
Tonya Wood was the only titled owner of record, and Willard Wood 
executed the Woods7 Deed only because he appeared as a trustor with 
Tonya Wood on the Kofoed Trust Deed and, consequently, might appear 
to have some naked interest of record notwithstanding his prior 
conveyance. (R. 410, #6; R. 413, #6) 
8. On February 24, 1982, a "Partial Satisfaction of Judgement" 
was entered in the Burton Lawsuit, (R. 339; R. 291, #20; R. 389, #1). 
Under the Partial Satisfaction of Judgment, Willard Wood remained 
liable for $4,323.73 on the Judgment, plus interest. (R. 291, #21; 
R. 389, #1) 
9. On December 21, 1982, Greg Baldwin, as grantor, executed a 
"Quit-Claim Deed" for his interest in the Property to Lynda Baldwin, 
as grantee, which was recorded on December 21, 1982. (R. 340; R. 
291, #22; R. 389, #1) 
10. On April 21, 1983, Willard Wood, together with Tonya Wood, 
filed a "Petition For Voluntary Bankruptcy" ("Wood's Bankruptcy") 
under Chapter 7 in the United States Bankruptcy Code, a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit "C". (R. 341; R. 470, #3? R567, #4; R, 291, 
#23; R. 389, #1) Under the Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons are listed as 
creditors of Willard Wood and were given notice of Wood's Bankruptcy. 
(R. 291, #24; R. 389, #1; R. 447, #3; R. 567, #4) Pursuant to 11 
U.S.C., Section 524(a)(1), upon Willard Wood's discharge in bank-
ruptcy in December 1983, (R. 470, #4; R. 567, #6), the Judgment was 
"void" and he was released from all personal liability thereunder* 
Burtons were thereafter stayed from collecting the Judgment. 
11. On August 6, 1986, nevertheless, Burtons caused an 
"Execution" ("Execution") to issue on the Judgment against Willard 
Wood, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D". (R. 343; R. 291, 
#25; R. 389, #4.a.). Under the Execution, the Sheriff had apparent 
authority to levy on and sell only the unexempt property of Willard 
Wood, (R. 292, #29; R. 389, #1), but no authority to levy on and sell 
the real property of Baldwins. (R. 292, #30; R. 389, #4.b.) 
12. On August 4, 1986, Burtons prepared a "Praecipe" 
("Praecipe"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "E", which they 
later delivered to the Sheriff. (R. 344, R. 292, #31; R. 389, #1) 
Under the Praecipe, however, Burtons directed the Sheriff to levy 
upon the right, title and interest of Baldwins in the Property, (R. 
292, #33; R. 390, #4.c), rather than 1 evy upon the nonexempt 
property of the judgment debtor, Willard Wood, as the Execution 
purportedly authorized, (R. 343; R. 292, #32). Baldwins are neither 
judgment debtors under the Judgment, (R. 333), or execution debtors 
under the Execution, (R. 343), nor parties to the Burton Lawsuit, (R. 
330), referred to by the Judgment, Execution and Praecipe. 
13. On August 11, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Notice of Real 
Estate Levy" ("Notice of Levy"), a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "F". (R. 346; R. 292, #34; R. 389, #1) Under the Notice of 
Levy, the Sheriff levied upon all the right, title and interest of 
Baldwins (rather than Willard Wood) in the Property. (R. 346) 
14. On August 12, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Notice of Real 
Estate Sale," ("Notice of Sale"), a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "G", which was filed on August 17, 1986. (R. 347; R. 293, 
#35; R. 389, #1) Under the Notice of Sale, the Sheriff stated he 
intended to sell the right, title and interest of Baldwins (rather 
than Willard Wood) in the Property. (R. 347; R. 293, #37) 3& 
On August 15, 1986, the Sheriff caused to be published a "Notice of 
Real Estate Sale" ("Newspaper Notice"), a copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit "H". (R. 348; R. 293, #39; R. 389, #1) Under the 
Newspaper Notice, the Sheriff that he intended to sell all the right, 
title and interest of Baldwins (rather than Willard Wood) in the 
Property. (R. 348; R. 293, #41) 
16* On September 9, 1986, the Sheriff conducted a sheriff's 
sale ("Execution Sale"), wherein the Sheriff sold all the right, 
title and interest of Baldwins in the Property, (R. 294, #44; R. 390, 
4.d., 4. a., 4.b.), but did not sell the interest of Willard Wood. 
(R. 352; R. 353; R. 366; R. 294, #47; R. 390, #4.d.) At the 
Execution Sale, the Sheriff sold the interest of Baldwins to Burtons 
for $8,760.10. (R. 352; R. 353; R. 366; R* 290, #45) 
17. On or about September 8, 1986, Burton, Sr. signed the 
worksheet regarding the Execution Sale. (R. 294, #49; R. 389, #1) 
On September 9, 1986, Burton, Jr. purchased Burton, Sr.'s interest in 
the Judgment. (R. 265; R. 296, #61) 
18. On September 12, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Real Estate-
Execution Return" ("Execution Return"), a copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit "I", which was filed on September 12, 1986. (R. 352; R. 
294, #50) Under the Execution Return, the Sheriff stated he sold the 
right, title and interest of Baldwins (not Willard Wood) in the 
Property, (R. 352; R. 294, #51), not the interest of Willard Wood. 
(R. 352; R. 294, #51) 
19. On September 12, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Real Estate 
Certificate of Sale-Execution" ("Certificate of Sale"), a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "J", which was recorded on September 16, 
1986. (R. 353; R. 294, #53) Under the Certificate of Sale, the 
Sheriff stated that he "... was commanded ... to satisfy the judgment 
in said action [Burton Lawsuit] by selling the unexempt real property 
of the said defendant [Willard Wood]." (Emphasis added.) (R. 353; 
R. 295, #54; R. 389, #1) 
20. On May 7, 1987, the Sheriff executed a "Sheriff's Deed" 
("Sheriff's Deed"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "K", which 
was recorded on May 8, 1987. (R. 366; R. 296, #63; R. 389, #1) 
Under the Sheriff's Deed, the Sheriff conveyed to Burton, Jr. and 
Emily Burton all the right, title and interest of Baldwins (not 
Willard Wood) in the Property. (R. 296, #s 63-64) 
21. On June 10, 1987, the trustee under the Kofoed Trust Deed 
sold the Property at a trustee's sale ("Trustee's Sale"), and 
delivered a "Trustee's Deed" to Robert Rice, which was recorded on 
June 18, 1987. (R. 368; 296, #65; R. 389, #1) On June 18, 1987, 
Robert Rice, as grantor, delivered a "Warranty Deed" for the Property 
to Derald Tilley, as grantee, which was recorded on June 18, 1987. 
(R. 371, R. 296, #67; R. 389, #1) 
22. On October 17, 1987, Derald Tilley executed a "Quit Claim 
Deed" for the Property to Lynda Baldwin, which was recorded on 
October 8, 1987. (R. 379, R. 297, #71; 389, #1) 
23. On June 22, 1988, Lynda Baldwin, as grantor, executed a 
"Quit Claim Deed" for the Property to the Lynda C. Baldwin Trust, 
which was recorded on June 23, 1988. (R. 380; 297, #72; R. 389, #1) 
24. The Burton Group has never sought or obtained a decree in 
any court voiding the conveyance of (i) Willard Wood to Tonya Wood 
under the Willard Wood Deed, or (ii) Tonya Wood to Baldwins under the 
Woods' Deed. (R. 433, #39; R. 298, #83; R. 299, #85) 
25. The Burton Group has never obtained a decree in any court 
reviving the Judgment from Wood's Bankruptcy or authorizing the 
Sheriff to levy on and sell the interest of Baldwins in the Property. 
(R. 297, #74; R. 390, #4.e., 4.a. and 4.b.). They have never 
obtained a decree in any court foreclosing their judgment lien 
against the Property or the interest of Linda Baldwin therein. They 
have never had possession of the Property. (R. 409, #3; R. 412, #3) 
26. Lynda Baldwin has never been personally served with a copy 
of the Execution, Praecipe, Notice of Levy or Notice of Sale 
regarding the levy on and sale of her property, and has never been 
served with process of any kind in the Burton Lawsuit. (R. 410, #7; 
R. 413, #7). She has never received notice of any hearing in the 
Burton Lawsuit, and has never waived her right to due process of law. 
(R. 410, #8; R. 413, #8) 
27. After reacquiring the Property, Lynda Baldwin amended her 
complaint and filed a "Motion For Summary Judgment" ("Motion"), (R. 
423), a "Supplemental Motion For Declaratory Or Summary Judgment" 
("Supplemental Motion"), (R. 472), and a "Motion To Dismiss 
Counterclaim" of the Burton Group, (R. 477). The Burton Group also 
moved for summary judgment on their counterclaim. (R. 493) 
28. In its "Memorandum Decision" ("Memorandum Decision)", dated 
May 25, 1989, (R. 572), and subsequent "Order" ("1989 Order"), (R. 
590), and "Partial Summary Judgment" ("Partial Summary Judgement"), 
(R. 587), both dated June 21, 1989, copies of which are attached as 
Exhibits "L", "M", and "N", respectively, the trial court held that: 
(i) the Willard Wood Deed was valid; (ii) Willard Wood had no 
interest in the Property when the Judgment was entered; (iii) Burtons 
didn't have a lien against the Property; (iv) the Burton Group could 
have filed an action to attack the Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent 
conveyance, but didn't; (v) the statute of limitations had run on 
asserting a claim for fraudulent conveyance; (vi) the Judgment was 
voided by Wood's Bankruptcy; (vii) Baldwins were bona fide purchasers 
for value; (viii) the Execution Sale was wrongful and violated Lynda 
Baldwin's due process rights; (ix) the Execution Sale and Sheriff's 
Deed were void; and (x) Lynda Baldwin's damages would be reserved for 
later determination. Title was quieted in Lynda Baldwin, and the 
Burton Groups' counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. 
29. In its "QE£S£M ("1990 Order"), (R. 669), and "Judgment" 
("1990 Judgment)", (R. 667), both dated June 4, 1990, copies of which 
are attached as Exhibits "O" and "P", respectively, the trial court 
awarded Lynda Baldwin damages against the Burton Group of $7,872.66, 
representing her "attorney's fees and related damages" in the matter. 
The 1990 Judgment was granted based on the "Affidavit Of Attorney's 
Fees" filed by Lynda Baldwin's counsel. (R. 641) Burtons objected 
to the Affidavit, (R. 659), but did not file any opposing affidavit. 
30. After the Burton Group appealed, Paul Richins became the 
assignee of appellee Lynda Baldwin's judgment and interest, and was 
later substituted as appellee with the Burton Group's consent. 
SPWMARY OF APCTHENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
The Judgment Is Lien Only Against Unexempt Real Property 
Of The Judgment Debtor, Willard Wood, Owned At The Time 
The Judgment is a lien against only the unexempt real property 
of the judgment debtor, Willard Wood, owned by him at the time the 
Judgment is docketed, and not a lien against the property of any 
other person, particularly Lynda Baldwin who is not even a party to 
the Burton Lawsuit. 
ARGUMENT II 
The Judgment Is Void Pursuant To Willard Wood's Bankruptcy; 
And Judgment Lien Did Not Survive The Bankruptcy 
The Judgment is an void under 11 U•S.C•, Section 524(a)(1), 
because of the bankruptcy of Willard Wood, and no lien survived 
Wood's Bankruptcy for the reason that there was never was a valid 
lien to begin with. Pursuant to Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons were no 
longer creditors of Willard Wood* 
ARGUMENT III 
Burtons Had No Remedy To Levy Execution Against The Property 
Without A Valid Statutory Lien And An Enforceable Judgment 
A writ of execution may not lawfully issue under Rule 69(a) 
U.R.C.P., in absence of a valid lien supported by an enforceable and 
valid judgment. In this case, there was neither. 
ARGUMENT IV 
Burtons Had No Remedy To Bring An Equitable Action To Attempt To 
Set Aside The Willard Wood Deed Without An Enforceable Judgment 
Wood's Bankruptcy prohibited the Burton Group from bringing a 
new claim to attack the Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent conveyance, 
since they were no longer creditors of Willard Wood. The Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act does not create a "new claim11 following a bankruptcy. 
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ARGUMENT V 
The Burton Group Has Waived Any Claim Of Fraudulent Conveyance 
By Not Raising It As An Affirmative Defense In Their Answer 
The Burton Group did not raise fraud as an affirmative defense 
in their Answer, as required by Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., nor pled it with 
particularity, as required by Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P. They have waived 
that defense and are precluded from later making or asserting a claim 
for fraudulent conveyance in response to a motion for summary 
judgment. If the Burton Group believed the Willard Wood Deed was a 
fraudulent conveyance, they were compelled to plead and proved it* 
ARGUMENT VI 
Statute of Limitations Bars The Burton Group From 
Attacking Willard Wood Deed As Fraudulent Conveyance 
Burtons were chargeable with "constructive notice" of the 
allegedly fraudulent conveyance under the Willard Wood Deed at least 
when they became judgment creditors of Willard Wood, and the three-
year statute of limitation began to run on June 9, 1981, the date the 
Judgment was docketed. Other facts may establish constructive notice 
prior to or slightly later than that date. The Burton Group is time-
barred in asserting a claim for a fraudulent conveyance. 
ARGUMENT VII 
The Willard Wood Deed Is Valid, And Has Never Been 
Set Aside Or Properly Challenged In Any Equitable Action 
The recorded Willard Wood Deed is prima facie genuine and valid. 
A conveyance which is fraudulent as to creditors is not absolutely 
void, but only voidable upon some affirmative action by an interested 
person. The Burton Group could have challenged the deed as a fraud-
ulent conveyance prior to Wood's Bankruptcy, but didn't. They deemed 
it "unnecessary". Burtons wrongfully invoked the remedy of Section 
25-1-15(2), U.C.A. 
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ARGUMENT VIII 
Lynda Baldwin Was Deprived Of Her Property 
Without Due Process Under the Execution Proceedings 
Under the execution proceedings, Lynda Baldwin was deprived of 
a substantial property right without due process of law. She was not 
a party to the Burton Lawsuit, nor a judgment or execution debtor, 
nor a fraudulent transferee under any conveyance. There was no order 
authorizing a sale of her property. 
ARGUMENT IX 
Lynda Baldwin Is A Bona Fide Purchaser For Value 
And Has Never Lost That Status 
When Lynda Baldwin and Greg Baldwin purchased the Property from 
Tonya Wood, they were bona fide purchasers for value. Lynda Baldwin 
is not required to prove in the first instance that she was a bona 
fide purchaser. The burden was on Burtons to plead and prove she was 
not. She never lost that status, notwithstanding a trustee's sale. 
ARGUMENT X 
The Burton Group Wrongfully Levied Execution On Lynda Baldwins' 
Property Which Justified Setting Aside Execution Sale 
The Burton Group acquired a writ of execution without an 
enforceable judgment and without a valid statutory lien. They levied 
execution on Lynda Baldwin's property, who was not a judgment or 
execution creditor, or fraudulent transferee under any conveyance. 
ARGUMENT XI 
The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Lynda Baldwin 
Attorney Fees And Related Damages 
The trial court correctly awarded Lynda Baldwin damages of 
"attorney's fees and related damages11 under (i) Section 78-27-56, 
U.C.A., (ii) wrongful execution, (iii) slander of title, (iv) Rule 
11, U.R.C.P., or (v) a combination of them. 
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ARGUMENT XII 
Summary Judgment Is Appropriate 
The Burton Group may not avoid Lynda Baldwin's motions for 
summary judgment, which are supported by affidavits, by resting on 
mere assertions, allegations and factual conclusions. They have not 
set forth specific facts under the issues of the pleadings showing a 
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT I 
The Judgment Is Lien Only Against Unexempt Real Property 
Of The Judgment Debtor, Willard Wood, Owned At The Time 
The Burton Group's main response to Lynda Baldwin's Motions for 
Summary Judgment and throughout their Brief is the claim that when 
the Judgment was docketed, a judgment lien attached to the Property 
pursuant to Section 78-22-1, U.C.A.; that the lien survived Wood's 
Bankruptcy; that the lien had priority over the subsequent purchase 
by Baldwins; and that Burtons were entitled to satisfy the Judgment 
by levying execution on and selling the interest of Baldwins, as 
alleged wsuccessors-in-interest of Willard Wood". However, Willard 
Wood conveyed his joint tenancy interest in the Property to Tonay 
Wood under the recorded Willard Wood Deed (Ex. *hn) over one year 
before the Judgment (Ex. "B11) was docketed. Therefore, Willard Wood 
had no interest in the Property, and no lien attached. Regardless of 
anything Willard Wood later signed, that conveyance has never been 
set aside and conclusively conveyed his estate at that time! 
f,The creation, legal effect, and extent of a judgment are set 
out in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-22-1.w Cox Corp. v. Vertin. 754 
P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988). The rule of strict construction must be 
employed in determining whether one is authorized to have a statutory 
lien. Dean v. McFarland. 500 Pe2d 1244 (Wash. 1972). The scope 
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cannot be extended. American Buildings Company v. Wheeler's Stores, 
585 P.2d 845 (Wyo. 1978). Section 78-22-1 provides for "whose" 
property the lien attaches, and "when" the lien attaches: 
"From the time the judgment of the district court or 
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the 
clerk of the district of the county it becomes a lien upon 
all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt 
from execution, in the county in which the judgment is 
entered, owned by his at the time, or by him thereafter 
acquired during the existence of said lien." 
Under the facts of this case, only the unexempt real property of 
the "judgment debtor", Willard Wood, "owned by him at the time" is 
exposed to a lien imposed by a judgment in personam. Belnap v. 
Slain, 575 p.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1978); Taylor Natt Inct Vt Jensen 
Bros. Const. Co., 641 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah 1982). A judgment lien 
commences from the date the judgment is entered. Hartley v. Liberty 
Park Associates. 774 P.2d 40, 42 (Wash. App. 1989); 49 C.J.S., 
Judgments, Sec. 466(a), p. 902. 
But Willard Wood had effectively divested himself of his 
interest before Burtons recorded the Judgment, and the Property was 
no longer "real property of the judgment debtor" under the statute. 
Rowe v. Schultz. 642 P.2d 881, 882 (Ariz* App. 1982). "Under no 
circumstances will a judgment or decree take effect upon rights not 
then existing." 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) Sec. 712, p. 1503. 
"The court views this section as requiring that the judgment debtor 
shall be the owner, or have a vested interest, in the real estate." 
Warren v. Rodgers. 475 P.2d 775, 776 (N.M. 1970)- If the Property 
was not owned by him at the time, then no lien attached. Belnap, at 
698, citing Maiewsky v. Empire Construction Company, 467 P.2d 547 
(Cal 1970). Sfifi also Romeo v. State. 642 P.2d 172, 176 (N.M. 1982); 
citing 2 A.C. Freeman On Judgments, Sec. 950 (5th ed. 1925). 
In this case, the judgment lien was clearly subordinate to the 
Willard Wood Deed, and did not attach to any interest of Willard Wood 
conveyed to Tony Wood thereunder. Where a judgment debtor no longer 
owns property, filing of a judgment cannot relate back and make the 
judgment a lien on property theretofore owned by the judgment debtor. 
49 C.J.S. Judgments, Sec. 466(b), p. 903. f,A judgment creditor 
cannot place a lien against the property of a judgment debtor's 
grantee." Lach v. Desert Bank. 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah App. 1987). 
A judgment lien is not effective as to property conveyed from a 
judgment debtor prior to recording of the judgment. Lack, at 804-05. 
Ses also Teed v. Ridco Reality. Inc.. 655 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Ariz. 
App. 1982); RoweP supra, at 883; citing 10 A. G. Thompson on Real 
Property, Sec* 5308, at 662 (1957); McClanahan v. Hawkins. 367 P.2d 
196 (wash. 1961). Hannah yf Martinson, 758 p.2d 276, 278-79 (Mont. 
1978); and 49 C.J.S. Judgments, Sec. 485, at p. 929 (1947). 
Nothing in 78-22-1, U.C.A., imposes a lien on the real property 
of any person other than the judgment debtor, including an alleged 
"successor-in-interest11. The statute is intended to limit the lien 
to property of the judgment debtor only, and not give a lien on some 
other person's property". Sfifi Thompson v. Hendricks. 245 P. 724, 726 
(Or. 1926); United Finance Co, Gladstone v. King. 590 P.2d 228, 229 
(Or. 1979); Partlow v. Clark. 653 P.2d 568, 569 (Or* App. 1983); and 
Wilson v. Willamette Industries. 569 P.2d 609, 611 (Or. 1977). Lynda 
Baldwin is not "judgment debtors", nor a "successors-in-interest" of 
Willard Wood. Baldwins are transferees of Tonya Wood. Nor does the 
statute does not authorizes a lien on Tonya Wood's independent, joint 
tenancy interest. "Even though a judgment creditor held a lien on 
one joint tenant's undivided one-half interest in the real property, 
no lien existed on the second joint tenant's interest in the 
property." First Nat. Bank of South Glenn v. Energy Fuels Inc. 
Corp., 618 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1980). 
Willard Wood delivered the Willard Wood Deed to Tonya Wood, but 
later executed the Kofoed Trust Deed, thus creating the appearance on 
the public record that he still had some "naked interest" in to the 
Property. Whenever one has no beneficial interest "there is nothing 
to which the judgment lien can attach". Belnap, at 699. A judgment 
lien attaches only to actual and not to apparent interest of judgment 
debtor; for the protection of equities, a judgment lien is confined 
to actual interest which judgment debtor had at the time the lien 
attached. Thompson. at 725-26. 
Nor did a judgment lien attach to the independent, one-half 
interest Tony Wood acquired from directly from Kofoeds and later 
conveyed to Baldwins. If a non-judgment debtor is the owner of one-
half, joint tenancy interest in property, and conveyance thereof 
vests in the transferee a title unassailable as fraudulent as to 
creditors of the judgment debtor who hold the other one-half 
interest. See McHenry F.S> . Inc. v. Clausen, 491 P.2d 592, 594 
(Colo. 1971); and Schwaller T.umhgr Co., Inc. v. Watson. 505 p.2d 640, 
645 (Kan. 1973). 
It is clear from Section 78-22-1, U.C.A., that a judgment lien 
is confined to the "actual interest" in the Property which the 
"judgment debtor", Willard Wood, "owned at the time" the Judgment was 
docketed. Since Willard Wood had no interest in the Property at the 
time the Judgment was docketed, no valid judgment lien attached. 
ARGUMENT II 
The Judgment Is Void Pursuant To Willard Wood's Bankruptcy; 
And Judgment Lien Did Not Survive The Bankruptcy 
In April 1983, Willard Wood filed a Chapter 7 petition for 
voluntary bankruptcy together with with Tonya Wood, (Ex. "C"), was 
discharged in August 1983, and the case was closed in December 1983, 
(R. 470, #4). Burtons were listed as judgment creditors and given 
notice of Wood's Bankruptcy, (R. 291, #24; R. 389, #1), and never 
denied it. In August 1983, Willard Wood was discharged in 
bankruptcy, and his case was close in December 1983, (R. 470, #4). 
Therefore, under 11 U.S.C., Section 524(a)(1), the Judgment is "void"1 
to the extent of the personal liability of Willard Wood: 
"Effect of discharge. (a) A discharge in a case under 
this title —> 
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to 
the extent that such judgment is a determination 
of the personal liability of the debtor " 
The Judgment [was] an unsecured claim, fully dischargeable under 
that bankruptcy statute. Section 524(a)(1) merely voids judgments to 
the extent they are unsecured, and a judgment creditor cannot seek 
recovery in his judgment other than that obtainable against his 
security. In Re Sillani. 9 B.R. 188, 189 (S.D. Florida 1981). The 
Burton Group claims a valid judgment lien attached to the Property 
prior to Wood's Bankruptcy. But as "lien claimants", they never 
filed a proof of claim. (R. 567, #5) Therefore, they must rely 
solely on their "alleged11 lien. De Laney v. City and County of 
Denver. 185 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1950). 
In their Brief, page 44, the Burton Group state that, 
notwithstanding the discharge of Willard Wood's personal liability 
under the Judgment, "Burtons' judgment lien was upon the property, 
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which passed to Baldwins upon Hood's execution of the September 30, 
1981 Warranty Deed." They further argue that 11 U.S.C., Section 
506(d) M•• expressly excludes from discharge liens which have not 
been made a part of the bankruptcy proceeding, either by the filing 
of a proof of claim or by being made an "allowed secured claim". 
They cite the legislative history, Matter of Taraow.749 F.2d 464 (7th 
Cir. 1984), and De Laney, supra, as supporting authority* 
However Matter of Tarnow and DeLaney are distinguishable because 
both concern statutory liens that attached to the property prior to 
the debtor's bankruptcy* In this case, a valid lien never attached 
to the Property prior to Wood's Bankruptcy! If there was no lien, it 
certainly couldn't be "passed to Baldwins" under any scenerio. 
ARGUMENT III 
Burtons Had No Remedy To Levy Execution Against The Property 
Without A Valid Statutory Lien And An Enforceable Judgment 
Rule 69(a), U.R.C.P., provides that the "[p]rocess to enforce a 
judgment shall be by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise 
directs . • •w The statute seems to confine the legal process to 
enforcement of a "judgment". It says nothing about enforcement of a 
"judgment lien". Arguably, a writ of execution is not the legal 
process for enforcement of a "lien", in and of itself, in absence of 
a valid and an enforceable judgment to support it* w.. Ordinarily, 
a judgment lien is enforced by a levy or sale under the judgment 
creating it.w But, ".. the lien generally terminates when the judg-
ment ceases to be enforceable .." Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 700 
(Utah 1978); quoting 2 Freeman On Judgments (5th Ed*)* Sec. 1017a, p. 
2123. In any event, for issuance of a writ of execution on real 
property, a valid lien must attach whether or not an enforceable 
judgment is required. But neither is present in this case. 
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Nonetheless, just as Section 78-22-1, U.C.A., specifically 
confines the lien to the unexempt real property of the judgment 
debtor, Rule 69(b), U.R.C.P., also limits the writ of execution to 
the property of the judgment debtor, and does not authorize execution 
on some other person's property. The Rule states that " [u]less the 
execution otherwise directs, the officer must execute the writ 
against the property of the judgment debtor ...t9 Even if there was 
a valid lien on the Property supported by an enforceable judgment 
under which a writ of execution may duly issue, the Execution (Ex. 
lfDn) authorizes a levy on and sale of only the unexempt real property 
of Willard Wood, the judgment debtor, not that of Baldwins: 
"THESE ARE THEREFORE, to command you to .. levy on and sell 
.. the unexempt real property of the said Willard D. Wood.11 
Following a ordinary execution sale, Rule 69(e)(6), U.R.C.P., 
authorizes the sheriff to convey " •• all right, title, interest and 
claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property", but not that of 
a non-judgment debtor, and Rule 69(d), U.R.C.P. provides that "[ajny 
excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing costs must be 
returned to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the 
judgment or order of the court.11 Thus, Rule 69, U.R.C.P., clearly 
limits the process of enforcing a judgment by writ of execution to 
the property of the "judgment debtor99, unless otherwise directed. 
The Judgment contains no decree authorizing or directing a levy on 
the property of Lynda Baldwin, a non-judgment debtor, nor an order of 
sale having such effect. Therefore, even if Willard Wood hadn't been 
discharged in bankruptcy, the Judgment is not one upon which a writ 
of execution may duly issue for the purpose of levying on and selling 
the property of Lynda Baldwin. 
ARGUMENT IV 
Burtons Had No Remedy To Bring An Equitable Action To Attempt To 
Set Aside The Willard Wood Deed Without An Enforceable Judgment 
"A levy of execution is ordinarily the only proper method to 
enforce a judgment lien, unless the case involves special 
circumstances ..ff Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978); 
citing Free v. Faraworth. 188 P.2d 731 (Utah 1948). Even if the 
Willard Wood Deed was a fraudulent conveyance, this case involves 
special circumstances such that execution under Rule 69(a) did not 
lie. Belnap. at 700-01. M.. [W]here for some reason execution does 
not lie, the procedure for enforcement is an equitable action to 
foreclose the judgment lien", Belnap at 701, and "have the court 
control the sale of the property after determining the priority of 
liens". Belnap. at 700, citing the general rule set forth in 2 
Freeman On Judgments, 5th Ed., Section 1017a, p. 2123, which is: 
"... Ordinarily a judgment lien is enforced by a levy or 
sale under the judgment creating it. And since the lien 
generally terminates when the judgment ceases to be 
enforceable, there would be no occasion for resorting to 
equity in most cases. Nevertheless, if for amy reason 
there is no remedy at law, or the remedy provided by 
statute is inadequate, ... the general jurisdiction of 
equity may be invoked to enforce the lien ..." 
Regardless of whether a writ of execution could issue under 
these facts or not, the only conveivable way a judgment lien could 
ultimately attach to the Property was for the Willard Wood Deed to be 
set aside. As long as the deed was valid, no lien could ever attach 
or have priority. Prior to Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons could have 
attempted to set aside the Willard Wood Deed if they thought is was 
fraudulent and foreclose the lien in an equitable action. But Wood's 
Bankruptcy voided the Judgment, and since a fraudulent conveyance 
complaint is predicated on an obligation that no longer exists, there 
can be no "new claim11 for fraudulent conveyance. The Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act does not create a new claim. "If no new claim exists, 
there is no remedy. ... Only a creditor, that is no having a claim 
... may attack a conveyance as fraudulent." Clark v. Rossow, 657 
P.2d 903, 904 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
In Clark, the plaintiffs, Clark and Frizzell, brought a separate 
action to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent made by defendants, 
Rossows. Clark and Frizzel had obtained a money judgment against 
Rossows and attempted to collect the judgment from Rossows' grantee, 
Consociation, by garnishment proceedings. In a second action, Clark 
and Frizzell alleged that Rossows had made a fraudulent conveyance to 
Consociation and sought to have the conveyance set aside so they 
could execute on the real property. Consociation responded with a 
motion to have the judgment declared void since Mr. Rossow had been 
adjudged bankrupt in Minnesota, and, therefore, the judgment was 
discharged. That motion was granted and the trial court declared the 
judgment null, void, and of no force or effect.1 Clark said at 904: 
"[Consociation] moved for summary judgment on the theory 
that the prior judgment was void. Since the fraudulent 
conveyance complaint is predicated on an obligation claimed 
to be owing from the appellees Rossows to the appellants 
... [Clark and Frizzell] ... and there is no such 
obligation, the trial court properly dismissed the 
complaint. The fraudulent conveyance act, A.R.S., Section 
44-1001, et seq., does not create a MEW CLAIM. If a claim 
does not exist, there is no remedy. (Citing cases) The 
appellees Rossows were no longer creditors of the 
appellants [Clark and Frizzell]. Only a creditor, that is 
one having a claim .. • may attack a conveyance as 
fraudulent." (Emphasis added) 
1
 Lynda Baldwin made a similar motion as Consociation under 
the Supplemental Motion For Declaratory Judgment". dated March 15, 
1989. (R. 472) Therein, she sought to have the Judgment declared 
void for purposes of her prior "Motion For Summary Judgment". 
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Therefore, Wood's Bankruptcy effectively discharged any 
fraudulent conveyance claim that might be asserted by Burtons, and 
prohibited them from ever bringing an equitable action to foreclose 
the lien. Burtons were no longer creditors of Willard Wood and could 
not attach the Willard Wood Deed. Without being able to bring a 
claim to void the deed, there is no remedy under any Utah law. Thus, 
Burtons could never, and did not, acquire a lien on the Property 
superior to the interest of Lynda Baldwin. 
ARGUMENT V 
The Burton Group Has Waived Any Claim Of Fraudulent Conveyance 
By Not Raising It As An Affirmative Defense In Their Answer 
In its Memorandum Decision, page 6, the trial court correctly 
found that the Burton Group has never made a claim to set aside the 
Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent conveyance. Their Counterclaim 
does not evidence such claim, (R. 391), and they did not raised fraud 
as an affirmative defense in their Answer as required by Rule 8(c), 
U.R.C.P, (R. 387 to 388), much less plead it with particularity as 
required by Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P. Therefore, they waived that defense 
and are precluded from making it in response to a motion for summary 
judgment. nIn pleading to a proceeding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively .. fraud .. and any other matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense.11 Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P. nIn all 
averments of fraud .. the circumstances constituting fraud .. shall 
be stated with particularity.w Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P. Burtons' Answer 
fails under both Rules. 
The statutory requirement of pleading an affirmative defense, 
such as fraud, is supported by many decisions in Utah and other 
states. Any new matter that does not tend to controvert the opposing 
party's prima facie case shall be pleaded and is not put in issue by 
a denial made pursuant to Rule 8(b), U.R.C.P. General Ins. Co. of 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976), 
citing 2A Moores' Federal Practice (2d Ed.)/ Sec. 8.27[3], p. 185.). 
Affirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings, Rule 
8(c), and are usually waived if not pleaded, Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h); 
Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah 1986), citing Pratt v. Board 
of Education. 564 P.2d at 298. 
Lynda Baldwin is not bound to prove in the first instance or at 
the outset in support of her action that the Willard Wood Deed is 
valid and genuine. Ball v. AutryP 427 P.2d 424, 428 (Okl. 1966); 
RQlUlW vf LQJdoiq, 512 P.2d 937, 941 (Alaska 1973); 5 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 1271 (1969); 2A J* 
Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 8.27 [3] (2nd Ed. 1972). If the 
Burton Group believes the deed is fraudulent, the burden is them to 
raise the "new matter" which might constitute an avoidance or an 
affirmative defense of Lynda Baldwin's complaint. McCasland v. 
Prather. 585 P.2d 336 (N.M. App. 1978). Any alleged fraud under the 
Willard Wood Deed, an affirmative defense, affects the substantial 
rights of Lynda Baldwin and will not be abrogated. Allis-Chalmers 
CQCPt Vt SyqJtQWJCZ, 571 P.2d 224, 225 (Wash. App. 1977), citing 
Farmer'? Insurance CQt Vt Miller, 549 p.2d 9 (wash. 1976). The fraud 
also be plead fraud with particularity by setting out specific facts 
constituting the alleged fraud. Sade v. Hemstrom. 471 P.2d 340, 345 
(Kan. 1970). 
Thus, failure to plead the affirmative defense results in waiver 
of it and exclusion of the issue from the case. Turon State Bank v. 
Bozarth. 684 P.2d 419 (Kan. 1984); Chandler v: Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028 
(Mont. 1982); and RST Service Mfg. Inc. v. Mussell White. 628 P. 2d 
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366 (Okl. 1981). Upon such failure ".. no evidence can be submitted 
relevant £o that issue." Schmidt v. Sadri, 601 P.2d 713 (Nev. 1979). 
An alleged fraudulent conveyance "is not put at issue by a 
general denial" of Lynda- Baldwin's prima facie case. 5e£ gfrinn ZXV-
Equipment. Inc. v. Marchard. 462 P.2d 571, 572 (Wash. App. 1969), 
citing 1A Barron and Holtzoff Fed. Prac. & Proc, Sec. 277, at 147, 
and 2A Moore's Fed. Prac, Sec 8.27[3]k. The Burton Group cannot 
"make a demand for affirmative relief by filing an answer defensive 
in nature which tends only to establish a defense or interpose a bar 
to plaintiff's right to recover", SS£ Firestpne Tire $ Rufrfter CQt Vt 
Barnett. 475 P.2d 167, 170 (Okl. 1970). 
In response to the motions for summary judgment, the Burton 
Group submitted affidavits attacking the Willard Wood Deed, trying 
"to establish a defense or interpose a bar to plaintiff's right to 
recover." Firestone Tire & Ruber, at 170. But defenses that have 
not been raised by the answer or proper motion may not be raised in 
an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and do 
not create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary 
judgment. Valley Banft ft Trust Co, yy WilKen, 668 P.2d 493-94 (Utah 
1983). SS& also Sadfi, at 346. SSS. also Radio Corp. of America v. 
Radio Station KYFM. Inc.. 424 F.2d 14 10th Cir. (Wash. 1970); and 2A 
J. Moore, Fed. Prac, Sec. 8.27[3] (2d Ed. 1975). 
Therefore, an alleged fraudulent conveyance is an affirmative 
defense that affects the substantial rights of Lynda Baldwin, and 
must be plead and with the required particularity. "Belated 
affidavits11 filed by Burtons in response to the motions for summary 
judgment are insufficient. Thus, even if such a claim had survived 
Wood's Bankruptcy, the Burton Group has waived it. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
Statute of Limitations Bars The Burton Group From 
Attacking Willard Wood Deed As Fraudulent Conveyance 
The trial court correctly found that the Burton Group was barred 
from attacking the Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent conveyance under 
the three year limitations period imposed by Section 78-12-26(3), 
U.C.A., which states: 
"78-12-26. Within three years — Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovcsry by the 
aggravated party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake•" 
So when did Burtons discover facts constituting the alleged 
fraud? The "conveyance" was made in May 1980 • Burtons had 
"constructive notice" of the alleged fraudulent conveyance at three 
different dates: (i) in Nay 1980, when the Willard Wood Deed was 
recorded, (ii) in June 1981, when the judgment was entered in the 
Burton Lawsuit; and (iii) in September 1981, when the Kofoed Trust 
Deed and Wood's Deed were recorded and Baldwins took "open and 
notorious possession" of the Property. While separately any of these 
facts might be insufficient to establish "constructive notice" of the 
alleged fraud, in the aggregate they are compelling. 
Regarding the "constructive notice" given to Burtons when the 
Judgment was docketed in June 1981, in Villa National B3flK v« green, 
478 P.2d 681, 682-83 (Colo. App. 1970), in was held, under facts 
substantially the same as this case, that a general creditor obtains 
"constructive notice" of the alleged fraudulent deed when he becomes 
a judgment creditor, and the statute of limitation begins to run when 
the final judgment is obtained. Citing Greco v» Puilara, 444 P.2d 
383, 384 (Colo* 1968). Thus, the statute of limitations began to run 
in June 1981, when the Judgment was docketed. But the statute of 
limitations might begin to run when the deed is recorded. In their 
Brief, page 26, Burtons cite Smith v. Edwards, 17 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 
1932) and Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975) as authority 
opposing that proposition. 
However, the facts in Smiih and Leach are distinguishable from 
those here. The words "until the discovery by the aggravated party 
of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake19 within Section 78-12-
26(3) mean from the time the fraud was known or could have been 
discovered in exercise of reasonable diligence, and do not 
necessarily mean from the time the party complaining had actual 
notice of the fraud. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Company, 490 P.2d 1062 
(Wyo. 1971). Burtons' claim for a fraudulent conveyance accrued, for 
statute of limitation purposes, when they, by exercise of "reasonable 
diligence", might have discovered it. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. 
Trout. 701 P.2d 851 (Ariz. App. 1985); and Coronado Development 
Corporation yf Superior Court# 678 p.2d 535 (Ariz. App. 1985). 
"Reasonable diligence11 in collecting a money judgment would 
require that at the time of or some time after acquiring the 
Judgment, Burtons would research the public record for any real 
property owned or recently transferred by Willard Wood, particularly 
his residence. Had they done so, Burtons would have discovered not 
one, but three deeds: (i) the Willard Wbod Deed, recorded in May 
1980, (ii) the Kofoed Trust Deed, recorded in September 1981, and 
(iii) the Woods' Deed, recorded in September 1981. Armed with such 
information, Burtons could have easily deposed Willard Wood to 
discover why he executed the two deeds in 1981 after he had conveyed 
his estate in 1980. If Burtons then believed the 1980 deed was 
fraudulent in light of the 1990 deeds, Burtons could have challenged 
it then, in 1981, or within three years thereafter. Therefore, the 
statute of limitations could begin to run no later than September 
1981, when the Kofoed Trust Deed and Wood's Deed were recorded, and 
the Willard Wood Deed was clearly evident. 
As creditors with a matured claim, Burtons could have also 
researched the public record prior to entry of the Judgment and found 
and attacked the Willard Wood Deed. A creditor who has a cause of 
action for an unliquidated demand may attack a conveyance in fraud of 
his rights prior to entry of judgment. The three-year limitations 
period accrues from the time the creditor has a claim or cause of 
action for an unliquidated demand, because he could attach the 
conveyance in fraud of his rights prior to entry of the judgment as 
he is held to be within the protection of the statutes against 
fraudulent conveyances. Babcock v. Tamr 156 F.2d 116, 121 (1946), 
citing Valley BanK Vt Malcolm, 204 P. 207, 214 (Ariz. 1922). Thus, 
an action by a judgment creditor to set aside for fraud a conveyance 
of property by a debtor to his wife is barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations where the action was brought more than three 
years after the conveyance was recorded. Babcock, supra. 
In their Brief, Burtons suggest that the Willard Wood Deed was 
given for "nominal consideration11, if any at all. Thus, the contents 
of the deed allegedly disclose the fraud. If that be true, the 
statute of limitations might begin to run when that deed was recorded 
in May 1980. When facts under which fraud is predicated are 
contained in written instrument placed on public record, there is 
constructive notice of its contents and the statute of limitations 
runs from date of recording. See Strong v. Clark. 352 P.2d 183, 184 
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(Wash. 1960). As such, it could begin to run even before a person 
has actual knowledge of the fraud or even all the underlying details 
of the alleged fraud. See Coronado Development Corporation, at 537; 
and Mr. Donut of America, Inc. v. Harris. 723 P.2d 670 (Ariz. 1986). 
Had Burtons used "reasonable diligence11 in researching the title to 
Willard Wood/s own residence, all three deeds would be discovered. 
Furthermore, Baldwins purchased the Property in September 1981, 
and were in open, exclusive and notorious possession from then on. 
"Open and notorious possession" is constructive notice to third 
parties of an outstanding equity, and a judgment creditor is thereby 
informed of sufficient facts to put him on inquiry by which he can 
ascertain the existence of the equity. Partlow v. Clark, 653 P.2d 
568, 570 (Or. App. 1983). Chaffin Yt SQlQIROn, 465 P.2d 217, 220 (Or. 
1970); and Wilson Yt Willamette Industries, Inct, 569 p.2d 6ii (or. 
1977). Burtons are clearly time-barred from bringing a new claim for 
fraudulent conveyance under any one or more of the above scenarios* 
ARGUMENT VII 
The Willard Wood Deed Is Valid, And Has Never Been 
Set Aside Or Properly Challenged In Any Equitable Action 
In the 1989 Order, the trial court correctly determined that the 
Willard Wood Deed was valid and enforceable. (Ex. fvMfV,#l) Under 
Section 57-4a-4(l), U.C.A., a recorded deed is presumed genuine, and, 
under Section 57-1-3, is presumed to pass a fee simple title unless 
otherwise stated. Thus, the recorded Willard Wood Deed is prima 
facie valid and conveyed his entire estate to Tonya Wood. Not only 
is the deed prima facie valid as between the parties, it is valid as 
to creditors. f,The holdings imply that [a] .. conveyance 'good as 
between the parties' cannot be void as to a creditor of the 
transferor11. Rowe v. Schultz. 642 P.2d 881, 884 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
Notwithstanding any document Willard Wood signed after his delivery 
of the deed to Tonya Wood, the deed is valid as to Burtons in absence 
of it being voided, if at all, in an equitable action. 
In the Memorandum Decision, page 6, (Ex. "L"), the trial court 
correctly found that "[n]o action has been filed to sat that 
conveyance aside .." In response, the Burton Group asserts in its 
Brief, pages 18-22, that no action was "necessary" because, in their 
opinion, the conveyance was "void in toto" under Section 25-1-8, 
U.C.A. The Burton Group further states on page 29, that: 
"Burtons have not requested that any fraudulent conveyance 
be set aside because such request is unnecessary, inasmuch 
as Burtons' judgment lien is of record. .. The fraudulent 
conveyance issue was first raised by Baldwins as a defense 
to Burtons' execution." 
Thus, Burtons allege they could simply disregard the conveyance 
and levy execution directly against Baldwin's property under Section 
25-1-15(2), U.C.A., without ever taking any action to void the 
conveyance. In their Brief, page 19, the Burton Group asserts that 
"a fraudulent conveyance is not merely voidable, but is "void in 
toto". They cite Meyer Yt general American CQrpQEafriQn/ 569 p.2d 
1094, 1098 (Utah 1977), and Cardon v. Harper. 151 P.2d 99, 102 (Utah 
1944). But Meyer and Cardon involve conveyances that were "decreed" 
void after an equitable action by the creditor, and those facts are 
distinguishable from this case were the Burton Group has never 
received a decree or found it "necessary" to take any such action. 
Notwithstanding the "shall be void" language of Section 25-1-8, 
U.C.A., if a recorded deed is prima facie valid, "[a] conveyance 
which is fraudulent as to creditors is not absolutely void, but is 
only voidable by the creditors." United States v. 442 Casks of Wine. 
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26 U.S. 547 (U.S. La. 1828).2 Burtons/ argument for the remedy 
otherwise is contrary to this Court's holding in Butler v. Wilkinson, 
740 P.2d 1244, 1262 (Utah 1987): "The remedy provided by the Act for 
a fraudulent conveyance is the voiding of the conveyance. Section 25-
1-8.w This implies the deed is not "void11, but merely "voidable". 
It is clear from Butlerr United States, and the cases footnoted 
below that a deed which secures the private rights of the parties 
interested is not "void", as if it never had any effect, without some 
affirmative action to avoid it. But Burtons claim it was 
"unnecessary" to take such action, and, therefore, didn't. Adopting 
Burtons' theory would shift the burden under an alleged fraudulent 
conveyance from the creditor to the transferee. Section 25-1-8 does 
not have that intent. 
The Burton Group asserts on page 20 of their Brief that because 
the Willard Wood Deed was void, they had the right to disregard it 
and levy on the Property under Section 25-1-15(2), U.C.A. They claim 
that: "This statute expressly allows credtors to disregard a 
fraudulent conveyance, and to execute upon property which is under 
the name of the fraudulent transferee". In relying on that remedy, 
the Burton Group cites Jensen v. Eames. 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974); 
Gayne v. Bailey, 564 P.2d 348 (Wash. App. 1977), ffontana AffS'n 9f 
Credit Management Vt Hergert, 593 p.2d 1059 (Mont. 1979), and sassJsin 
Yt KerStinq, 458 P.2d 544 (Ariz. 1969). 
2
. The question of "void" or "voidable" was addressed in detail 
in Doney v. Lauahlin. 94 N.E. 1027, at 1028, and in Mutual Benefit 
Life Ins. Co. v. Winne, 49 P. 446, at 488. (No deed which secures 
the private rights of the parties interested is ever "void", but 
merely "voidable" upon the proper action by an interested party.) 
See Footnote No. 4 on pages 21-23 of Lynda Baldwin's "Reply 
Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motions For Summary Judgment" for a 
summation of that authority. 
In those cases, however, after obtaining the judgment, the 
judgment creditors took appropriate action against the "transferee" 
within an equitable proceeding to set aside the fraudulent 
conveyance. But Burtons never did that. Even then, to invoke the 
remedy of Section 25-1-15(2), the property must be in the "hands of 
a fraudulent transferee". Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1262, 
(Utah 1987). But when Burtons levied execution directly on the 
interest of Lynda Baldwin, the Property was not in the "hands of a 
fraudulent transferee", it was in the hands of Lynda Baldwin. Tonya 
Wood was the alleged "fraudulent transferee" under the Willard Wood 
Deed, not Lynda Baldwin who acquired her interest from Tonya Wood. 
Moreover, Butler, at 1262, implies that when a creditor looks to the 
fraudulently conveyed property under Section 25-1-15(2), the transfer 
must be "held" void as a fraudulent conveyance. 
Thus, prior to Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons might have levied 
execution when the Property was in the hands of Tonya Wood, but 
didn't. They waited 5 years and then levied execution on property in 
the hands of Lynda Baldwin, and Lynda Baldwin certainly contested. 
And the Jensen court, at 428, held that ".. once contested the burden 
is upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the transfer was in fact fraudulent." 
When Lynda Baldwin brought her prima facie case to dimiss the levy, 
the Burton Group could not dispense with their burden of pleading and 
proving the conveyance was fraudulent. Sackin v. Kerstina. 458 P.2d 
544, 547 (Ariz. App. 1969). The evidence shows they did nothing, 
relying instead on their assertion that the conveyance was "void", 
and any action was "unnecessary". 
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ARGUMENT VIII 
Lynda Baldwin Was Deprived Of Her Property 
Without Due Process Under the Execution Proceedings 
Any procedure which deprives an individual of a significant 
property interest must satisfy due process of law. Mervyn's Inc. v. 
Superior Court in and for Maricooia County. 697 P.2d 690 (Ariz. 
1985). SSS Bank of Ephriam v. Davis. 581 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Utah 
1978); State In Interest of L.G.W.. 638 P.2d. 527, 528 (Utah 1981) 
and celebrity Slvfoi Inct Vr Utah Liquor Cqntrol QQJK'TI, 657 p.2d 1293, 
1296 (Utah 1982). "Implicit in the due process clause of our state 
Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their 
rights under the law.11 Gribble v. Gribble. 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 
1978). A hearing is constitutionally required when an action taken 
by this State deprives a person of a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moore yf Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 
634, 637 (Utah 1986). A writ of execution may not issue against the 
property of Lynda Baldwin without a prior hearing. See Sniadach v. 
Family Finance Corp.f 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969). A hearing must be 
prefaced by a timely notice which adequately informs Lynda Baldwin of 
the specific issues she must prepare to meet. Nelson v. Jacobson, 
669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). 
To give the execution proceedings validity, she must be brought 
within the jurisdiction of the court by service of process within the 
State, or by her voluntary appearance. Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. 
733; Bonford v. Socony Mobile Oil Co.. 440 P.2d 713 (Okl. 1968). 
Lynda Baldwin was not served with process in the manner provided by 
law. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired without strict compliance with 
the statute governing service of process in civil actions. Shields 
v. Pirkle Refri. Trucking,. Inc.. 591 P.2d 1120 (Mont. 1979). First 
and basic to jurisdiction is service of process. Painter v. Olney, 
680 P.2d 1066 (Wash. App. 1984). A levy on Lynda Baldwin's property, 
deprived her of a significant property interest without due process. 
The constructive seizure, intiated by Burtons under a void 
judgment without a valid lien, encumbered the Property with a lien 
and inhibited Lynda Baldwin's right to dispose of or encumber her 
asset. PanK of Ephriaro, at 1005. 
ARGUMENT IX 
Lynda Baldwin Is A Bona Fide Purchaser For Value 
And Has Never Lost That Status 
Under the facts and law of this case, Lynda Baldwin is not 
required in the first instance to prove she is a bona fide purchaser 
for value ("BFP") under Section 25-1-13, U.C.A. Moreover, the Burton 
Group never made a claim to defeat Lynda Baldwins BFP status in their 
answer or counterclaim, and could not so in response to a motion for 
summary judgment. Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundarem, 692 
P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). Nevertheless, Baldwins were BFPs in 
September 1981, when they purchased the Property from the only titled 
owner of record, Tonya Wood, (R. 158; R. 550; R. 546, #6). They had 
no notice of the Judgment or any alleged fraud under the Willard Wood 
Deed. (R. 546, #8) 
Burtons argue in their Brief, page 31, that Lynda Baldwin is not 
a BFP because w[a] purchase is not made in good faith if it is made 
with notice of a prior adverse interest in the property". They argue 
that "docketing of a judgment operates as constructive notice of the 
existence thereofff. This argument has no merit because there was no 
"prior adverse interest", in that no lien attached to the Property. 
Burtons also argue in their Brief, page 33, that Lynda Baldwin 
is not a BFP because she had "actual knowledge" of the Judgment 
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through her alleged agent, Western States Title Company ("Western")• 
This argument as well has no merit because the Judgment did not 
create a lien against the Property. Nonetheless, Western was not the 
agent for Baldwins. Baldwins never employed Western to research the 
title, nor did they ever pay Western to do so. (R. 545, #2) 
Upon acquiring the Property, Baldwins had no "actual knowledge" 
of the Judgment from Western or anyone else. (R. 410, #4; R. 413; R. 
546, #6, 7, 8 & 9) Burtons, however, argue on page 33 of their Brief 
that Western's "failure to discover or disclose Burton's judgment 
lien .. is no defense to Burton's lien." Once again, no judgment 
lien ever attached, so there was nothing to disclose. Although 
Western knew of the Judgment against Willard Wood, (R. 138, #7), they 
also knew of his prior conveyance under the Willard Wood Deed, (R. 
138, #8). Moreover, the question in determining Lynda Baldwin's BFP 
status under Section 25-1-13 is whether Lynda Baldwin, through 
Western or otherwise, had previous notice of any fraudulent intent of 
her immediate grantor, Tonya Wood, or of any fraud rendering void the 
title of Tonya Wood. Knowledge of a "judgment" is irrelevant under 
Section 25-1-13, which states: 
"25-1-13. Bona fide purchasers not affected. The 
provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to affect 
or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable 
consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had 
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate 
grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such 
grantor." 
Notwithstanding Western knew of the Judgment, there is no 
evidence that even remotely suggests that Western had previous notice 
of any alleged fraud under the Willard Wood Deed. Baldwins purchased 
the Property without any previous notice whatsoever of any alleged 
fraudulent intent under any conveyance, believing in good faith that 
it belonged to Tonya Wood. As evidenced in their affidavits, no one 
ever told Baldwins anything that would cause them to know or believe 
there was anything improper regarding the Willard Wood Deed. (R. 
410, #5; R. 413, #5; R. 546, #s 8-9; R. 566, #3) These facts are 
undisputed in any document or affidavit submitted by Burtons. 
In their Brief, page 33, the Burton Group argues that Baldwins 
personally had at least constructive notice of the fraudulent nature 
of the Wood's Deed delivered to them on September 30, 1991. The fact 
that Willard Wood signed the Woods' Deed does not affect title to the 
Property because he had no interest then. Willard Wood's signature 
on the Woods' Deed does not put Baldwins on notice to inquire further 
or question the validity of the Willard Wood Deed, since Tonya Wood 
was the only titled owner of record. (R. 550) Baldwins clearly 
provided the reason that Willard Wood signed Woods' Deed, i.e., 
because he appeared to have some "naked interest of record19. (R« 
410, #6; 413, #6) That "naked interest of record", if any, resulted 
presumptively from his signature on the Kofoed Trust Deed. 
In their Brief, page 34, the Burton Group argues that even if 
Lynda Baldwins was a BFPs at the time of her initial purchase, she 
subsequently lost that status because of the foreclosure of the 
Kofoed Trust Deed, notwithstanding she later reaquired the Property 
from Derald Til ley. (R. 379) But a loss of Lynda Baldwin's interest 
under the Kofoed Trust Deed foreclosure in 1986 doesn't change the 
fact that she was a BPF in 1981 when she purchased from Tonya Wood. 
Under Section 25-1-13, if she had no previous notice of any 
fraudulent intent of her immediate grantor, Tonya Wood, or of any 
fraud rendering void the title of Tonya Wood, she was a BFP. 
Burtons also claim that when they levied the Execution, they 
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were relying on Section 25-1-15(2), U.C.A. But the remedy of that 
statute is not available when the alleged fraudulent conveyance is to 
a BFP "one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such 
a purchaser". There is no evidence that Tonya Wood, the transferee 
under the Willard Wood Deed, is anything but a bona fide purchaser, 
and Baldwins derived their title through her. In Butler v. 
Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1262 (Utah 1987), this Court determined the 
"BFP" issue and the availability of the remedy under Section 25-1-8 
under facts similar to ours. Butler. at 1262, held that: 
"The remedy provided by the Act for a fraudulent conveyance 
is the voiding of the conveyance. Section 25-1-8. That 
remedy is not available, however, when the property has 
been transferred from the fraudulent transferee to a third-
party purchaser for value without 'notice of a fraudulent 
intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering 
void the title of such grantor. Section 25-1-13. Since 
Christensens did not have that intent, the conveyance to 
them cannot be voided." 
* * * * * 
"Generally, when a transfer is [held] void as a fraudulent 
conveyance, the creditors look to the fraudulently conveyed 
property under Section 25-1-15. In this case, however, the 
land was not in the hands of a fraudulent transferee [Tonya 
Wood], but was owned by the Christensens [third-party 
grantees of the transferees]* Section 25-1-13 deals with 
property that is fraudulently conveyed, but held by 
innocent third persons. That section provides that the 
provisions of the Act do not affect the title of a 
purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. The trial 
court expressly found Christ ensen to be a bona fide 
purchaser, and we have affirmed that ruling." 
Sfifi also jQhngQn V» Smith/ 455 P. 2d 244, 245 (Wyo. 1969); Cody 
Finance Co, v. Leaaett. D. Wyo., 116 F. Supp. 700, 705 (reaffirmed 
214 F.2d 695); 53 C.J.S., Sec. 13; and Hudson Trust Co, v. Davis. 49 
S.Ct. 179, 278 U.S. 655. ".. [A] conveyance obtained through fraud 
and deceit is not a nullity, but a conveyance from a fraudulent 
grantee [Tonya Wood] to a third person [Baldwins], who purchased the 
property in good faith and for a consideration, will be held valid as 
against the first grantor [Willard Wood]." Mid Kansas Federal 
Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Binter, 415 P.2d 278, 282 (Kan. 1966). 
Until a debtor's creditors have acquired some "lien" on his property, 
he may depose of it and give a good title to bona fide purchasers 
without regard to such creditors. Hurst v. D.P, Davis Properties, 54 
S.Ct. 857, 292 U.S. 648. 
Thus, the protection under Section 25-1-13 is available to Lynda 
Baldwin if she was a "purchaser for a valuable consideration" who 
purchased the Property without "previous notice of the fraudulent 
intent of [her] immediate grantor or of the fraud rendering void the 
title of such grantor". Conversely, the remedy under Section 25-1-
15(2) is not available to Burtons if Lynda Baldwin was a "purchaser 
for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of 
the purchase or one who has derived title immediately or mediately 
from such a purchaser". 
ARGUMENT X 
The Burton Group Wrongfully Levied Execution On Lynda Baldwin's 
Property Which Justified Setting Aside Execution Sale 
The Execution (Ex. "D") which was prepared by Burtons, was 
wrongfully sought and issued without a valid lien and enforceable 
judgment. It states ".. the amount actually due thereon is $4,323.73 
and interest .." It authorized a levy on and sell the unexempt real 
property of the judgment debtor, Willard Wood. But Burtons issued a 
"Praecipe" (Ex. "E") directing a "levy on all right, title and 
interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors-in-
interest of Willard D. Wood, defendant in the above-entitled action". 
Pursuant to the Praecipe, the Sheriff prepared a Notice of Levy (Ex. 
"F") and "levied upon the right, title, claim and interest of Gregory 
Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors-in-interest of Willard D. 
Wood..." Under the Notice of Sale (Ex. "G") and Newspaper Notice 
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(Ex. f,H,f)/ the Sheriff intended to sell Baldwins' property. The 
Certificate of Sale (Ex. "J") and Sheriff's Deed (Ex. "K") evidence 
the levy on and sale of Baldwins' property. Under all such documents 
subsequent to the Execution, it is clear Burtons intended to levy on 
and sell the property of Baldwins to satisfy the unenforceable debt 
of Willard Wood out of their property. 
Thus, there were substantial prejudicial irregularities both in 
the acquiring the Execution and in causing the Execution Sale, and 
the Burton Group deliberately caused all of it. The trial court 
correctly found that: H.. Burton has obtained Baldwin's property by 
improperly prepared documents, all in violation of the rights of 
Baldwin". (Ex. "L", p. 5). In the 1989 Order, the trial court 
correctly determined that all documents subsequent to the Execution 
19
.. were wrongfully and erroneously prepared, issued and carried out 
without legal justification ..w (Ex. "M", #5) The Burton Group's 
actions did not conform to statutory requirements, and deprived Lynda 
Baldwin of her property without due process. 
"Where the property sold was not subject to sale, the sale 
should be set aside .. as only the execution debtor's interest in the 
property is affected by the sale." 33 C.JeS., Sec. 232, p. 491. A 
sheriff's sale of real property should be set aside when the sale 
fails to conform to statutory requirements« 2-H Ranch Co.. Inc. v. 
Simmons, 658 P.2d 68 (Wyo. 1983). The Sale was justly set aside. 
ARGUMENT XI 
The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Lynda Baldwin 
Attorney Fees And Related Damages 
Under the 1989 Order granting partial summary judgment to Lynda 
Baldwin, the trial court reserved for later determination ff.. the 
issues of damages under such claims, including attorney's fees 
incurred by Baldwin in regards to her having the Execution Sale and 
Sheriff's Deed voided .." (Ex. "M", #7) Dwight Epperson, Esq., 
counsel for Lynda Baldwin, then filed his "Affidavit Of Attorney's 
Fees" ("Damages Affidavit"), (R. 641), requesting $12,715.25 in 
damages. In response, Burtons filed an objection ("Objection") to 
the Damages Affidavit. (R. 659) Following a hearing on May 14, 
1990, the trial court allowed only 60% of the total damages requested 
by the Damages Affidavit. (R. 666) Subsequently, under the 1990 
Order and 1990 Judgment, the trial court awarded $7,829.66 to Lynda 
Baldwin, representing "attorney's fees and related damages" incurred 
by her in the matter. (Ex. "0"; Ex. "P"; R. 669, 667.) 
The detailed facts of the Damages Affidavit are uncontroverted 
by any affidavit of the Burton Group. Rule 56, U.R.C.P., "is no 
different where the subject of the summary judgment is a claim for 
attorney fees". Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah 
App. 1989). "..[W]here attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing 
party on summary judgment, the undisputed, material facts must 
establish, as a matter of law, that (1) the party is entitled to the 
award and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable." Taylorr at 169. 
Notwithstanding they filed the Objection, the Burton Group did not 
file any opposing affidavit controverting either the damages 
requested or their reasonableness. Taylor. at 172. "Thus, there was 
no dispute of material fact regarding the damages requested or their 
reasonableness." Taylor. at 169. Therefore, attorney's fees may be 
awarded on summary judgment if the record contains an unrebutted 
affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award* 
Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975). 
Uncontroverted testimony concerning the amount of a reasonable fee 
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provides an adequate basis for the fee award. South Sanpitch Co. v 
Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App. 1988). 
In their Brief, pages 36-39, the Burton Group argues the trial 
court errored in awarding any damages. They claim the trial court 
didn't indicate the "legal basis" for the award, but did acknowledge 
it could be under either (i) Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., (ii) slander 
of title, or (iii) wrongful execution. To affirm the damage award 
this Court must conclude, in light of the undisputed facts, that a 
"legal basis" exists. Taylor, at 168. Although the exact legal 
basis is not specifically set out as such in the Memorandum Decision, 
1990 Order, or 1990 Judgment, the 1989 Order does shed some light on 
the mind of the trial court in this regard. (Ex. "M", #s 5 & 7) But 
there is no transcript of the hearing in the record or written 
memorandum informing this Court of the trial court's legal view of 
the matter. However, this Court "can affirm the judgment if any 
legal basis exists to justify the trial court's award of damages." 
Beuhner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
The legal basis for the award of "attorney's fees and related 
damages" can be found under (i) Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., (ii) 
wrongful execution, (iii) slander of title, (iv) Rule 11, U.R.C.P., 
or (v) a combination of any or all of them, as discussed hereafter. 
Actions Or Defenses Without Merit And Lacking Good Faith 
One such legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls 
under Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., which provides: 
"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute 
or agreement, the court may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith." 
"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or 
agreement, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense 
to the•action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith." Taylor, at 170. "The standard in that section specifically 
includes an examination into the good faith of a litigant," O'Brien 
v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah 1987). "Lack of good faith for 
purposes of 78-27-56 turns on subjective intent." Taylor, at 170? 
Cafly yt jQhnSQH, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983). 
Cady. at 151, held that two elements are required under Section 
78-27-56 in addition to being a prevailing party: (i) the claim must 
be "without merit"; and (ii) the losing party's conduct must be 
"lacking in good faith". Cady, at 151, then defined both elements. 
First, "without merit" means "bordering on frivolity", citing Can-Am 
Petroleum Co, v. Beck. 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir.1964), or "of little 
weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact." Second, 
"lacking in good faith" means the inverse of "good faith". "Good 
faith" means: "(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact 
that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay or defraud 
others". Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1987), citing Cady. 
at 151. "Lacking in good faith" is found when one of the three above 
elements is lacking. Cady. at 151. There is substantial evidence in 
the record that the Burton Group's conduct and defenses thereof were 
both "without merit" and "lacking in good faith", as shown by the 
following facts more fully discussed elsewhere in this brief. 
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As detailed throughout this brief, the claims and defenses of 
the Burton Group have no basis in law or in fact and are "without 
merit" because: (i) the Willard Wood Deed was prima facie valid under 
57-4a-4(l), U.C.A., avoidable only upon a successful equitable 
attack; (ii) there was no valid lien against the Property under 78-
22-1, U.C.A.; (iii) Burtons only lien rights were against the 
unexempt real property of Willard Wood; (iv) the Judgment was no 
longer enforceable because of 11 U.S.C., Section 524(a)(1); (v) no 
lien survived Wood's Bankruptcy because there was never a valid lien 
to begin with; (vi) an affirmative action to foreclose the lien and 
set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance was necessary to 
establish lien priority over the interest of Lynda Baldwin; (vii) 
title to the Property was clearly in the name of Lynda Baldwin when 
Burtons levied execution; (viii) all execution documents were 
improperly prepared and irregular, and violated Lynda Baldwins due 
process rights; (ix) an execution proceeding under Rule 69, U.R.C.P., 
where no lien attached cannot be used as a substitute for an action 
to foreclosure an alleged judgment lien; (x) 11 U.S.C., Section 
524(a)(1) prohibited a claim for fraudulent conveyance, and the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act did not create a "new claim11; (xi) there 
was no remedy under Section 25-1-15(2) because Burtons were no longer 
judgment creditors and had lost their ability to attack the Willard 
Wood Deed; (xii) there was no remedy under Section 25-1-15(2) against 
a person other than a "transferee", nor against a bona fide 
purchaser; (xiii) legal process under Rule 69(a), U.R.C.P., was not 
available absent a valid lien and an enforceable judgment; (xiv) the 
statute of limitations under 78-12-26, U.C.A., had run a claim for 
fraudulent conveyance; (xv) Lynda Baldwin was not a party to the 
Burton Lawsuit, had not been served with legal process, and that 
court had no jurisdiction over her or her property; (xvi) Lynda 
Baldwin was not a judgment or execution debtor, nor a "successor-in-
interest" to Willard Wood, nor a "transferee" of him; (xvii) the 
execution proceeding was conducted with erroneously and wrongfully 
prepared documents; (xviii) Lynda Baldwin was a BFP; and (xix) all 
the other reasons detailed throughtout this brief. The Burton 
Group's arguments against in support of their claims and defenses 
contradict the law of this case and ever material finding of the 
trial court. Thus, their claims and defenses are "without merit". 
The conduct of the Burton Group is "lacking in good faith" 
because: (i) they could not have had "an honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question", in that they were 
represented by counsel with full knowledge of the facts and law on 
the issues and there was no legal basis whatsoever for anything they 
did; (ii) they clearly "intended to take unconscionable advantage" of 
Lynda Baldwin's financial plight under the Kofoed Trust Deed 
foreclosure by implementing the wrongful levy on and sale of her 
property without justification; and (iii) they intended to defraud 
the court and ultimately Lynda Baldwin of her property by 
representing to the court clerk, upon delivering the Execution for 
the court's issuance; that the Judgment was enforceable against 
Willard Wood when they knew it was not; i<>e«, by inference, they 
purposely concealed the fact that the personal obligation shown in 
the Execution was discharged in Wood's Bankruptcy and Willard Wood 
was no longer liable to Burtons for the amount shown therein. Proof 
of any one of these facts establishes the second element, "lack of 
good faith". See Eames v. Eames, at 397; citing Cady. at 151. 
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Wrongful Execution 
Another legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls 
under "wrongful execution,f. Attorney's fees may be an item of 
consequential damages flowing from the wrongful execution. There is 
simply no excuse for the Burton Group's cavalier conduct regarding 
Lynda Baldwin's property, particularly in absence of a statutory lien 
and enforceable judgment. The wrongful execution proceedings under 
Rule 69 were conducted under the direction and participation of 
Burtons. After acquiring the Execution (Ex. "D") against Willard 
Wood which they themselves prepared, Burtons issued the Praecipe (Ex. 
"E") directing the Sheriff to levy on and sell the property of 
Baldwins, rather than Willard Wood. Such wrongful execution was not 
only "lacking in good faith", but in direct violation of Utah law. 
The general rule of law regarding wrongful executions is that 
".. if it is shown that the execution creditor advised, directed or 
assisted in the commission of the unlawful act he will be liable with 
the officer for the injury sustained." Foley v. Audit Services. 
IH£Li., 693 P.2d 528, 531 (Mont. 1985); citing 33 C.J.S. Executions, 
Sec. 456(b)(2). "Liability is generally premised upon direct 
participation, such as advising the sheriff to seize certain assets 
not belonging to the judgment debtor or ratification of the sheriff's 
wrongful acts." Foley, at 531; citing several cases. "Moreover, if 
the creditor authorized the unlawful act, the creditor would be 
liable in its own capacity for wrongful execution." Foley. at 531. 
The general rule in Utah ".. is that attorney's fees are not 
recoverable unless allowed by statute or contracted for by the 
parties unless, of course, equity permits otherwise." Ranch Homes, 
Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 625-26 (Utah 1979); 
citing Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976). Attorney's fees 
incurred in a legitimate and reasonable attempt to secure the return 
of property by an order to quash the writ of execution are a 
reasonable, probable, and foreseeable consequence of a wrongful 
execution and are recoverable. Coaains v. Wright, 526 P.2d 741, 743 
(Ariz. App. 1974); 30 Am.Jur.2d, Executions, Section 763. ".. [T]hey 
are a legitimate item of damages caused by the other party's wrongful 
acts." Western Gas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchantr 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 
1980); citing Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 
1979), and 20 Am.Jur. 2d., Costs, Sec. 72. Such damages are allowed 
when the party performing the execution has acted in bad faith. 
Peterson v. Montana Bank of Bozeman. 657 P.2d 673, 681 (Mont. 1984). 
Attorney's fees may be awarded under the so-called "obdurate 
behavior11 doctrine, where the losing party is shown to have acted in 
bad faith or for oppressive reasons. Hall v. Cole. 412 U.S. 1, 93 
S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed. 2d 702 (1973); E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc. v. 
Andersonr 596 P.2d 413, 416 (Colo. App. 1979). "This exception 
applies to bad conduct relating to the prosecution or defense of the 
action." E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc.. at 416; citing 6 Moore, W. Taggart, 
J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice, SeCe 54.77[2] (2d ed. 1976). 
w[T]he dissolution of the writ of execution is conclusive that the 
writ was wrongfully obtained." Cogginsf at 743; citing cases. 
In their Brief, page 39, the Burton Group assert that Lynda 
Baldwin should not have been awarded damages because ".. Burtons' 
execution upon the property caused no damage to Baldwin". They claim 
Lynda Baldwin was in default under the Kofoed Trust Deed and about to 
lose her interest anyway. Moreover, they claim any conflict between 
the interests of Burtons under their alleged judgment lien and those 
represented by the Kofoed Trust Deed constitutes a conflict as to 
"lien priority", not a wrongful exection. This argument has no merit 
because there was no conflict in "lien priority". The fact is, 
Burtons had no valid lien under which to assert any priority. 
By initiating the wrongful execution, the Burton Group merely 
took unconscionable advantage of Lynda Baldwin in her financial 
plight. They did all this in direct violation and willful disregard 
of Lynda Baldwin's due process rights. Their cavalier conduct can 
best be summed up by their assertion that the Willard Wood Deed was 
"void", and they could simply "disregard" it. Accordingly, Burtons 
are liable for damages where such execution is caused by their 
disregard for the rights of others and their own misconduct, direct 
participation and bad faith. 
Slander of Title 
Another legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls 
under "slander of title". To be liable for slander of title, the 
Burton Group must "publish matter which is untrue and disparaging" to 
Lynda Baldwin's interest in the Property. Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 
644, 649 (Utah 1954). EsndSE, at 649-50, held that the publisher of 
the matter is liable under Restatement Of The Law On Torts, Vol. Ill, 
Sees. 624 and 626-7, if the disparaging matter, dealing with a 
statement of fact, is "untrue", or "if an expression of opinion is 
dishonestly made". 
All of the documents under the execution proceedings recorded 
against the title to Lynda Baldwin's property were "untrue" because 
they tell the public the Property was sold to the Burton Group, when 
in fact it wasn't• They tell the public Lynda Baldwin was a 
"successor-in-interest" of Willard Wood, when in fact she wasn't. 
The Burtons created the Execution document which dishonestly 
represented that they were still creditors of Willard Wood and he was 
still liable for the debt, when in fact he wasn't. They initiated, 
participated in, and condoned the preparation of erroneous documents 
that stated her property had been sold, when in fact it hadn't. Such 
documents were "disparaging" to Lynda Baldwin's substantial property 
interest because they created a frivolous cloud on her title that 
required this action. Pender, implies that attorney's fees may be 
appropriate if the above facts are present. (Cf. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel 
and Slander, Sec. 550.) 
Violation Of Rule 11, U.R-C.P. 
Another legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls 
under Rule 11, U.R.C.P. In Taylor Yt Estate Qf laylOF/ 770 P.2d 
163, 170-72 (Utah App. 1989), it was held: 
"Finally, we turn our attention to Rule 11, U.R.C.P., 
providing, in part, as follows: 
"The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modication, or reversal of existing 
law... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court ... 
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include ... a reasonable 
attorney's fee." 
This rule, which mirrors Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, "requires some 
inquiry into both the facts and the law before the paper is 
filed; the level of inquiry is tested against a standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances." 5 C. Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 1333 at 177 
(1987 Supp.). This objective approach allows sanctions to 
be imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the 
pre-amenedment, subjective "bad faith" approach. [Citing 
cases.] 
* * * * * * * * 
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However, in a number of cases this court has imposed 
sanctions pursuant to our rules, including R. Utah Ct.App. 
40(a) which imposes a similar duty on litigants and their 
counsel. [Citing cases•] 
* * * * * * * * 
Rule 40(a) is to this court what Rule 11 is to the trial 
courts* Both rules require attorney's and parties to 
reasonably inquire as to the facts and law before a 
document is signed and filed. Rule 40(a) is substantially 
similar to Rule 11 •." 
* * * * * * * * 
These cases establish that Rule 40(a) imposes a duty to 
investigate the factual and legal basis of an appeal or 
appellate document before filing. [Citing cases.] 
Subjective intentions are essentially irrelevant; the 
determination of whether the rule has been violated is made 
on an objective basis. Id. Except to the extent that a 
somewhat less forgiving approach should perhaps be employed . 
at the appellate level, we find that this analysis is 
equally applicable to the similarly worded Rule 11. 
* * * * * * * * 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 
is a question of law. [Citing case.] If a Rule 11 
violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated, 
and we will affirm the particular sanction imposed by the 
trial court, including the reasonableness of any fee award, 
absent an abuse of discretion. [Citing case.] We are 
mindful that Rule 11 gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the 
particular case. [Citing case*]" 
Applying the forgoing analysis of Taylor to this case, the award 
of fees to Lynda Baldwin must be affirmed. Clearly, a "reasonable 
inquiry" at the time by Burtons or their attorney, as contemplated by 
Rule 11, should have reasonably disclosed that their defense to Lynda 
Baldwin's Complaint, their counterclaim, their opposition to Lynda 
Baldwin's motions for summary judgment, and their own motion for 
summary judgment were not "well grounded in fact" nor "warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument". Substantially none of the 
defenses, claims and assertions in their pleadings have any basis in 
law or in fact. The Burton Group had a duty to investigate the 
factual and legal basis of their pleadings before filing. 
By failing to conduct this inquiry, the Burton Group and their 
counsel violated Rule 11. This neglect caused Lynda Baldwin to incur 
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legal expense in researching the legal basis and validity of their 
actions, and initiating and maintaining this lawsuit to void the 
execution proceedings and remove the cloud from her title. This is 
precisely the type of case Rule 11 is intended to address, and the 
facts mandate the sanctions awarded by the trial court. 
The imposition of $7,827 in "attorney's fees and related 
damages" as a sanction for violating Rule 11 is not an abuse of 
discretion. It was appropriate for the trial court: to consider and 
include the damages incurred by Lynda Baldwin in consequence of the 
Burton Group's conduct and their pleadings. Accordingly, under Rule 
11, there is a legal basis and undisputed factual support for an the 
damage award. 
Sanctions Under Rule 40(a), U.R.A.P. 
Substitute Appellee requests sanctions for having to respond to 
this Appeal. When sanctions are awarded in the trial court, they 
should be awarded to that same party if successful on appeal. See 
DiXQn Vt StQdflarfl, 765 P. 879, 881 (Utah 1988); and Management Servs. 
Corpt Vt Development Assoc?t, 617 p.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). 
Sanctions are awarded in situations were the "totality of defendant's 
argument compels this Court to find that he is attempting to take 
unconscionable advantage ..M which evidences a frivolous appeal. 
Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). See also 
Cady. at 397. The Utah Court of Appeals defines a frivolous appeal 
"as one having no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in 
Rule 40(a)." Q'Brien Vt RW5h, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). 
This Court equated frivolous with being without merit." O'Brien, at 
310. That alone meets the technical requirements of Rule 40(a). 
Substitute Appellee recognizes the right of a party to argue in 
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an attempt to correct what that party thinks is error in the trial 
court. But when there is no basis for the argument presented and 
when the evidence or law is mischaracterized and misstated and the 
claims have no merit, the Court must question the party's motives. 
See Eames
 f at 397-398. The facts and law of the case clearly show 
that no judgment lien ever attached to the Property under 78-22-1; 
that the execution proceedings were clearly wrongful and violated 
Lynda Baldwin's due process rights; and that an affirmative action 
was necessary to defeat the prima facie valid Willard Wood Deed. The 
trial court found no merit in any contentions or defenses of the 
Burton Group. Nevertheless, they continue to argue right into this 
appeal against substantially all of the trial court's findings, and 
further assert that all they did to Lynda Baldwin under the execution 
proceedings was merely that done by "any reasonable creditor under 
the circumstances.w The simple fact is, they never acquired a valid 
lien and were no longer creditors. Thus, the Burton Group has 
misstated the facts and law on several issues. 
It should have been equally obvious that the appeal has no 
reasonable legal or factual basis. The record shows that the trial 
court ruled against the Burton Group on every material issue they 
raised and dismissed their counterclaim with prejudice. The record 
further shows the trial judge carefully fashioned and reduced the 
attorney's fees and related damages after a fair opportunity for 
hearing. The Burton Group's claims on appeal simply controvert the 
findings of the court. They are not only without merit, but are also 
without basis in law or fact. Substitute Appellee is entitled to the 
benefit of Rule 40(a). This is exactly the type of case calling for 
their award. The case should be remanded for the limited purpose of 
determining sanctions against the Burton Group for bring this appeal, 
with an order requiring payment of them to Substitute Appellee. 
Related Damages 
Substitute Appellee performed certain paralegal services in the 
trial court for Dwight Epperson, Esq., attorney for Lynda Baldwin. 
Copies of the Itemized Statements submitted to Mr. Epperson by Paul 
H. Richins & Co., Inc., are attached to the Damages Affidavit. (R. 
644-658) In their Brief, pages 39-43, the Burton Group asserts the 
trial court errored in awarding Lynda Baldwin $4,597.60 in 
"secretarial fees and/or paralegal costs". However, the trial court 
did not specify any amount of the damage award as "secretarial fees 
and/or paralegal costs". In the 1990 Judgment, the court identified 
the $7,872*66 damage award as ".. payment for attorney's fees and 
related damages incurred by plaintiff in this matter", but did not 
allocate the award. To the extent any part of the "related damages" 
are secretarial fees and/or paralegal costs, the trial court must 
have concluded that each was an element of damages and recoverable. 
In regards to the element of "related damages", this Court "can 
affirm the judgment if any legal basis exists to justify the trial 
court's award of damages." Beuhner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). The Burton Group did not file any 
opposing affidavit controverting this element of damages or their 
reasonableness. See Taylor. at 172. "Thus, there was no dispute of 
material fact regarding the damages requested or their reasonable-
ness." See Taylor, at 169. This element of the attorney's fee may 
be awarded on summary judgment if the record contains an unrebutted 
affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award. 
See Freed Fin. Co., at 1040. Uncontroverted testimony concerning the 
amount of a reasonable fee provides adequate basis for the fee award. 
South Sanpitch Co, v Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App. 1988). 
Although not specifically addressed in this Court, several other 
courts have held that the services of paralegals and secretaries 
acting as paralegals under the supervision of the attorney are 
recoverable. Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp.. 374 S.E.2d 
868 (N.C. 1989); MUlti-IWtQ Vt ITT CQTOfflerSJal Finance, 806 S.W.2d 560 
(Tex. App. 1991); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 P.2d 810 (8th 
Cir. 1983), citing numerous federal cases; Aires v. Palmer Johnson, 
Inc. , 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. App. 1987); Newport v. Newport, 759 S.W.2d 
630 (Mo. App. 1988); Sebastian yf Texas Peptt of CQrrectiong/ 558 p. 
Supp. 507 (1983); S.R. v. S.M.R., 709 S.W. 2d 910 (Mo. App. 1986).3 
A "paralegal" includes "paralegals, legal assistants and law 
clerks". AEi£S, at 1384. "A paralegal is an assistant that 'act[s] 
for the lawyer in the rendition of [his] professional services' and 
is under his direct supervision." Newport, at 636. A legal 
assistant does "those things that an attorney does not necessarily 
need to do." Multi-Motor at 571. "Paralegals .. may perform legal 
services properly considered as a component in an award of attorney's 
fees". Aires. at 1384. "A trial judge, acting within his discretion, 
may consider and include in the sum he awards as attorney's fees the 
services expended by paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals 
if, in his opinion, it is reasonable to do so." Lea Co.
 r at 871. 
"In cases in which attorney's fees may be recovered, reasonable 
*• In Alaska, paralegal fees are recoverable as an item of 
costs, pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 79(b). Paralegal fees are 
routinely allowed by the Federal Courts in claims brought under 
federal statutes which provide for an award of attorney's fees. 
Hawkins Vt AnhSUSer-BVlSCh, 697 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1983); Sebastian v. 
Texas Deot. of Corrections, 558 F.Supp. 507 (Dist. Tex. 1983). 
paralegal fees are allowable." NewportP at 637; citing Hawkins. at 
817, and S.R.
 r at 916. "A party may separately assess and include in 
the award of attorney's fees compensation for a legal assistant's 
work, if that assistant performs work traditionally done by an 
attorney." Multi-Mottor at 570. "Paralegal fees should be allowed 
if reasonable and not duplicative of other legal fees." Hawkins, at 
817, citing numerous federal cases. 
The rationale behind the above cases is that the use of 
paralegals may result in savings to clients and lower overall fee 
awards. Lea, at 871. As this case clearly demonstrates, Mr. 
Epperson's use of Paul H. Richins & Co., Inc., as the paralegal 
resulted in a substantial savings to Lynda Baldwin. As complex and 
fact intensive as this case is, the total amount of $7,872.66 for 
attorney's fees and related damages is not unreasonable regardless of 
its allocation. Considerable research was required covering many 
legal issues. Based upon the hourly rates of both, it was more 
economical for the paralegal to do that research and other routine 
work than the higher priced attorney. Because of the indepth, 
pretrial work done by the paralegal for the attorney, this case never 
went to a long, expense trial that would have undoubtedly cost Lynda 
Baldwin and the state far more. In a trial, attorney's fees can 
escalate dramatically, and would have if this case had gone to trial. 
The paralegal performed the work under the direct supervision 
and control of the attorney, and billed the attorney for the 
services. The paralegal paid his own overhead and office expenses 
out of the hourly rate charged to the attorney. In his billing 
statement, the paralegal identified the nature of the work performed 
for the attorney, his hourly rate, and the number of hours expended 
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by him. The work was obviously necessary, and the attorney must have 
considered the paralegal's qualification acceptable or the attorney 
or would not have employeed him. But the qualifications of the 
paralegal were never objected to in the Objection, (R. 659), or put 
at issue in the trial court, although the Burton Group now attempts 
to put them at issue for the first time on appeal. 
Paralegal services are an adjunct of attorney's fees, rather 
than an item of costs. Treating paralegal expenses as an item of 
attorney's fees insures that such expenses are related to legal 
services and are performed under the auspices of an attorney. The 
Burton Group suggests that f,[a]llowing paralegal costs in the present 
case would encourage paralegals to act outside of the direction or 
control of a licensed attorney, in potential violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-51-25. However, Burtons have submitted no 
evidence whatsoever that the paralegal acted outside the direction or 
control of the attorney. In fact, the Damages Affidavit evidences 
such direct supervision and control. (R. 602) 
Presumably, the trial judge found facts to support the award of 
"attorney's fees and related damages99. The fact that the Damages 
Affidavit, which allegedly included reasonable paralegal fees, was 
uncontroverted by any opposing affidavit from Burtons, coupled with 
the presumptive expertise of the trial judge in assessing the facts 
and the Burton Group's overall conduct, claims and defenses, consti-
tutes sufficient justification for affirming the award. 
ARGUMENT XII 
Summary Judgment Is Appropriate 
The Burton Group submitted several affidavits containing mere 
assertions, allegations and factual conclusions that an issue of fact 
exists without a cause of action or proper evidentiary foundation to 
support them, and are insufficient to preclude granting of a summary 
judgment motion. To raise a genuine issue of fact, the affidavit 
must do more than reflect the affiant's opinions and conclusions, and 
must 'set forth specific facts' showing a genuine issue for trial. 
An assertion that an issue of fact exists without proper evidentiary 
foundation in support is insufficient to preclude summary judgment* 
see Reagan QirtflQQr Advertizing, met v- mntigrem, «>92 p.2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984), citing Norton v. Blackam. 669 P.2d 857 (1983); Wggter v. 
Sill/ 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); citing several cases; and Matter of 
Winslow's Estate, 636 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash- App. 1981). 
Burtons made their best showing under the pleadings and 
affidavits submitted. Burtons have not presented affirmative factual 
evidence or otherwise impeached the evidence presented in Baldwins' 
affidavits in their opposition to the motions for summary judgment. 
The only issue Burtons raised is whether the Willard Wood Deed was a 
fraudulent conveyance. But that issue is barred by (i) the statute 
of limitations, (ii) the discharge of the Judgment under Willard 
Wood's bankruptcy, and (iii) their failure to plead fraud as an 
affirmative defense. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact 
regarding a fraudulent conveyance, and the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate and serves 
its intended purpose of avoiding fruitless court proceedings with 
their attendant cost in time and money. Larson v. Wycoft Co.. 624 
P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981). 
DATED this 11th day of February, 1992. 
Paul H. Ricnilns 
Substitute Appellee 
- 58 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERBVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of February, 1992, I 
personally hand-delivered a true copy of the foregoing intrument to 
the law offices of David H. Schwobe, Esq., attorney for Appellants, 
at PERKINS, SCHWOBE & MCLACHLAN, 343 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
